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1. Introduction 
This note offers a brief analysis of Japanese banks’ behaviour in recent years. Section 2 reviews the 
current situation at Japanese banks and Section 3 attempts to build a model which describes their 
behaviour. Although there is no single model that succeeds in explaining banks’ behaviour 
consistently over the longer term, it is possible not only that their behaviour may be significantly 
affected by different factors in different periods but also that the same factor might have a different 
degree of impact depending on the period. In order to check the latter possibility, Section 4 focuses on 
the capital constraint and, making use of simulations within a dynamic model, reviews the influence of 
the capital constraint on banks’ decision-making regarding the amount of write-offs. 
2.  Japanese banks in recent years 
The Bank of Japan has been providing ample liquidity as part of its active pursuit of monetary easing 
and, as a result, overall financial market stability has been maintained (Figure  1). Within this 
environment, Japanese banks have been tackling management tasks such as the disposal of non-
performing loans (NPLs).  
The effects of the active monetary easing on banks’ profitability, however, seem complicated. For 
example, the profitability of deposits, ie the margin between the deposit rate and the market rate, 
which had been narrowing since the beginning of the 1990s along with the deregulation of deposit 
rates, finally fell to zero with the introduction of the zero interest rate policy that forced short-term 
market rates up against the zero bound (Figure 2). 
As for the disposal of NPLs, total credit costs at Japanese banks have exceeded operating profits from 
their core business since fiscal 1993 (Figure 3). In detail, write-offs of past NPLs have been 
accelerating (Figure 4) and the ratio of NPLs to total loans has started declining, albeit slowly 
(Figure  5). With regard to loan loss provisions, since fiscal 2002 major banks have adopted the 
discounted cash flow (DCF) method to calculate loan loss provisions for borrowers, with credit of 
¥10  billion or more, classified as “special attention”, and the loan loss provision ratio has risen 
(Figure 4). New NPLs, on the other hand, continue to arise, as Japan’s economy is in the midst of 
structural changes. Under such circumstances, Japanese banks should assume, for the time being, 
comparatively high credit costs, say around 1% against their loans outstanding. It is, therefore, still 
very important for banks to earn sufficient profits to cover these credit costs.  
Bank capital has become impaired not only because of these high credit costs but also because of 
stock market weakness. Since fiscal 2000 in particular, net unrealised stock-related gains have 
actually disappeared (Figure 6) and hence any losses that occur tend to impair capital. This tighter 
constraint on capital may have affected bank behaviour. For instance, during this process banks seem 
to have become more sensitive about the size of their loan assets, reducing overseas loans in the late 
1990s and subsequently even domestic ones (Figure 7). 
                                                       
1  We are grateful to the Department staff for the analyses in this note, especially Mr Junichi Suzuki for Section  2, 
Mr Shinobu Nakagawa for Section 3 and Appendix 1, and Mr Yutaka Soejima for Section 4 and Appendix 2. The views 
expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Japan. (Corresponding author: Takashi Kozu, 
e-mail address: takashi.kouzu@boj.or.jp).   
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3.  Modelling banks’ behaviour  
This section attempts to build a theoretically grounded model to describe bank behaviour consistently. 
Considering the issues discussed in the previous section, it may be expected that building such a 
model would prove problematic, and in fact it proves not to be possible to build a model capable of 
providing a fully satisfactory explanation of the observed reality. 
The model applied here is based on the assumption that the bank acts to maximise its present value 
and that its decision regarding the amount of loans to extend is dependent mainly on the loan margin. 
The following additional factors are also taken into account: (1) costs on loans, including losses from 
NPL disposal; (2) land prices, reflecting the value of collateral; (3) the constraint on capital; (4) net 
unrealised stock-related gains/losses; and (5) developments in the real economy. Appendix 1 explains 
the details of the model. 
As bank behaviour may depend upon balance sheet size, the model was estimated for both major 
banks and regional banks. We also carried out estimations for four different periods: (a) the whole 
period, fiscal 1985-2001; (b) the bubble period, fiscal 1985-89; (c) the first half of the 1990s, ie fiscal 
1990-96; and (d) the period from the second half of the 1990s onwards, ie fiscal 1997-2001. 
The main results obtained may be summarised as follows (Figure 8): 
•  It is not possible to obtain a satisfactory explanation of the lending behaviour of both major 
and regional banks that holds true throughout the whole period. 
•  Changes in the price of land, which served as collateral for loans, affected the lending 
behaviour of both major and regional banks, in the sense that higher land prices acted to 
lower costs on loans and hence to increase them, in the bubble period. 
•  The constraint on banks’ capital seems to have become binding, especially for major banks, 
since the second half of the 1990s. It was at this time that Japan experienced its banking 
crisis. 
Thus it is difficult to describe the lending behaviour of Japanese banks precisely enough with a single 
optimisation model. However, the following possibilities can be pointed out. One is that bank behaviour 
might be crucially influenced by different factors in different periods. The other is that the same factor 
might have a different degree of impact depending on the period. 
4.  Simulations of bank write-offs 
The second of the two possibilities introduced at the end of the previous section may apply to the 
capital constraint. When banks dispose of NPLs, they have to decide how much to write off. If they 
write off NPLs, they have to prepare for unexpected losses. However, future returns on loans should 
improve with the removal of unprofitable assets from their balance sheets. Capital constraints may 
affect this decision-making process. If the constraint is severely binding, banks may prefer to make 
provisions rather than to carry out write-offs since by doing so they would avoid unexpected losses 
and the resulting capital impairment. The extent to which the capital constraint is a binding factor in 
this decision-making process may vary depending on the period. 
In order to check this point, we use a dynamic macro model to perform simulations. Figure 9 gives a 
brief description of the simulation algorithm. The bank’s utility is assumed to be a function of its own 
expected future profits and the variance of this expectation. The bank is assumed to be facing 
uncertainty with regard to the macroeconomic condition in the future, about which it forms adaptive 
expectations. The bank goes bankrupt when its capital adequacy ratio falls below a certain minimum 
level. 
Two time points, the beginning of fiscal 1997 and of fiscal 2001, are considered. The bank is assumed 
to have full information on the economic structure at the end of fiscal 1996 and fiscal 2000 
respectively. Two hypothetical cases are considered: one where the bank is aggressive in carrying out 
write-offs, the other where it is not (Figure 10). The difference between the banks’ respective utilities in 
these two cases can be obtained through simulations. Appendix 2 explains the details of the model 
and the way simulations are conducted.  
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The main simulation results can be summarised as follows: 
●  In fiscal 1997, the capital constraint proved a binding condition in determining the amount of 
write-offs carried out by the bank (Figure 11). According to the simulation, the probability at 
that time that the bank would go bankrupt was fairly high, especially in the “aggressive 
write-off” case. The bank was therefore cautious about being overly aggressive in its 
write-offs. 
●  This result is more or less the same even when the bank possesses perfect foresight about 
the future macroeconomic condition (Figure 12). 
●  In fiscal 2001, on the other hand, the incentive for the bank to be aggressive in its write-offs 
was stronger (Figure 13). This may reflect changes in the bank’s situation, such as a gradual 
correction of the bank’s once optimistic expectations about the future economic condition, as 
well as enhancement of the bank’s capital via injections of public funds. 
The above results coincide with the fact that banks have been more active in their writing-off of NPLs 
in recent years. In addition, major banks are trying to reduce their stock holdings, as stocks are 
regarded as assets which carry a relatively high price fluctuation risk given their current capital levels. 
Such a reduction allows them to ease their capital constraints and to achieve more effective use of 
their capital. The Bank of Japan launched a scheme to purchase stocks held by banks to support their 
efforts in this regard and to mitigate the negative effects of stock price fluctuations on their capital. 
It is expected that the changes in the behaviour of Japanese banks reviewed in this note will become 
more firmly reinforced and this would contribute to improving their profitability over the coming years. 
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Appendix 1: 
Derivation of the optimal 
condition for bank behaviour 
Model
2 
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where β is the subjective discount factor, Et is the expectations operator conditional on information 
available in period t, and CF denotes the cash flow earned in each period. We define the bank’s cash 
flow as: 
t t Dt t Ct t St t Lt t C D r Call r S r L r CF − − − + = − − − − 1 1 1 1  (A1-2) 
where rLt, rSt, rCt, and rDt represent, respectively, the rates of return in period t on loans (L), securities 
(S), call money (Call), and deposits including debentures (D) outstanding at the end of period t – 1.
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where FLt is the net flow of loans in period t, assuming that, as new loans increase, credit exposure 
also increases to borrowers about whom available financial information is insufficient, resulting in 
higher monitoring costs for the bank (a2 > 0).
4 The parameter a3, on loans outstanding at the end of 
period t – 1, is regarded as a proxy for the magnitude of non-performing loans (NPLs) generated in 
period t, and is thus supposed to enter positively in equation (A1-3) (a3 > 0).
5 In short, costs on loans 
here include losses from NPL disposal as well as the implicit general and administrative expenses 
incurred in loan management. In the meantime, the larger the deposits, a proxy for bank scale, the 
more likely it is that loan portfolios will be diversified, and we therefore incorporate deposits as a scale 
variable acting to mitigate costs on loans. 










a a a   (A1-4) 
What equation (A1-4) implies is that appreciation in the value of land helps the bank to secure loans 
(ie its collateral role on loans), which is empirically found in the US bank data by Berger and 
Udell (1995).
6 If this implication is true, the sign condition will be that a5 > 0. 
                                                       
2  In building a model, we owe much to work by Elyasiani et al (1995) and Ogawa and Kitasaka (2000) aimed at capturing the 
bank’s optimal behaviour. 
3  When the bank takes out a net call loan, we interpret this to mean that it has a negative holding of call money. Since banks 
can generally control both holdings of and returns on negotiable certificates of deposits (NCDs) and straight bonds, they are 
not included in deposits. 
4 Although  FLt should be new loans made in period t in this sense, we use the difference in loans outstanding from period  
t – 1 to t due to the availability of such data. 
5 If  a3 is properly estimated, it should not be substantially different from actual credit costs (the NPL ratio) at banks. 
6  In Japan, movements in land values are almost perfectly negatively correlated with movements in the number of firm 
bankruptcies.  
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The balance sheet condition requires that the following identity holds: 
t t t t t t t t OL K Call D OA R S L + + + = + + +  (A1-5) 
where R is bank reserves defined such that Rt > ρDt (ρ: required reserve ratio, assuming simply that 
Rt = ρDt in the optimal representative bank case), K denotes capital, and OAt and OLt represent, 
respectively, other assets and liabilities at the end of period t. 
Without restrictions on asset management and given a change in deposits that is exogenously 
determined via the consumer’s optimal resource allocation, the bank’s optimal strategy is to choose 
{L, S, Call} in each period in order to maximise the value function (A1-1) subject to equations (A1-2) to 




































Decomposing conditional expectation terms into their certainty equivalent values and an expectation 
error under the assumption of rational expectations and rearranging them, we obtain the bank’s 
optimal lending function: 
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and ut+1 is an expectation error uncorrelated with any information in period t. 
In fact, bank lending behaviour has been restricted by the Basel Accord formally introduced in 1993, 
which is defined simply: 
, t t L K κ ≥    (A1-8) 
where κ is the required capital adequacy ratio.
7, 8 Taking account of this restriction and applying the 






























where  λt is the non-negative Lagrange multiplier associated with the bank’s capital requirement 
restriction.
9 Since λt is unobservable, the fourth term on the right-hand side of equation (A1-9) is set to 
be b3κt in later estimations, where b3 > 0 and κt is the actual capital ratio. 
                                                       
7  Note that, strictly speaking, Lt on the right-hand side of inequality (A1-8) should be the weighted risk assets derived from the 
BIS formula. Ito and Sasaki (1998) estimate the impact of the Basel capital standard on Japanese banks’ behaviour, and 
confirm its significance empirically. 
8  We do not account here for the existence of the bank lending channel, used to refer to the quantitative effect whereby 
deposits on the liability side affect loans on the asset side. Although this effect is empirically observed in the US bank data 
and documented in Kashyap and Stein (1997), we simply assume here perfect substitutability between deposits and money 
in the short-term financial market.  
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Data 
In estimating the Euler equation (A1-9), we employ annual settlement data from the accounts of 10 
major and 113 regional Japanese banks.
10 Our sample data run from fiscal 1982 to fiscal 2002. Due to 
data availability, the capital ratio (κt) is defined as core capital (Tier 1) divided by loans outstanding at 
the end of each period. For simplicity, the subjective discount factor (β) is set to be the average of the 
reciprocal of real gross returns on 10-year government bonds (deflator: GDP deflator) in the 
corresponding estimation period, and this is assumed to be common across all banks. Land prices 
(PL) are obtained from the Japan Research Institute of Real Estate, and we assume that banks face 
different land prices, depending on the location of their head offices. If a bank is located in one of the 
six largest cities, we use the “six largest cities” land price index for that bank. Otherwise, we use the 
“other cities” land price index (which excludes the six largest cities). 
Estimation method 
Under the assumption of rational expectations, the error term, ut+1, is uncorrelated with any variables 
known in period t. However, the Euler equation (A1-9) includes variables in period t + 1, and thus we 
use the iterative weighted two-stage least squares (2SLS) to estimate it as a system with the time-
series, cross-sectional data.
11 Instrumental variables are the constant, twice-lagged dependent 
variables, the twice-lagged loan-call rate spread (rLt+1 – rCt+1), once-lagged growth in stock values listed 
in the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and once-lagged growth in nominal GDP.
12 The 
purpose of including stock values and nominal GDP in the set of instruments is to consider the impacts 
of hidden profits from banks’ stock holdings and of demand for bank loans by firms on the model. 
In the estimation, the constant term b0 in the system is often regarded as a factor that is idiosyncratic 
for each agent. There are two well known cases: the “fixed effects” and “random effects” cases. Since, 
even if estimated, these effects are not significant, we do not consider them in the estimation here. 
This is equivalent to carrying out a pooling estimation in which it is not only the parameters b1 to b3 in 
the Euler equation (A1-9) that are all common across all sample banks, but also the parameter b0. 
The estimation period is split into several subperiods: from fiscal 1985 to fiscal 1989 (the bubble 
period); from fiscal 1990 to fiscal 1996 (the first half of the 1990s); and from fiscal 1997 to fiscal 2001 
(the second half of the 1990s onwards). We also consider the entire period from fiscal 1985 to fiscal 
2001. All parameters reported in Figure 8 are estimated using a simultaneous weighting matrix and 
coefficient control, where the convergence criterion is 1.0E-07. 
                                                                                                                                                                       
9  A good example of deriving the Euler equation (A1-9) is found in Zeldes (1989), in which the impact of quantitative 
borrowing constraints on consumers’ optimal resource allocation is evaluated. 
10  Due to the fact that mergers and nationalisation cause non-adjustable data discontinuities during the sample period, 
Shinsei Bank and Aozora Bank are excluded from the major bank sample, while Tokyo Star Bank and Kansai Sawayaka 
Bank are excluded from the regional bank sample. Mizuho Bank and Mizuho Corporate Bank, likewise Risona Bank and 
Saitama Risona Bank, are regarded as single banking entities, thus yielding the samples of 10 major banks and 113 
regional banks. 
11  Estimation results using the 3SLS method are basically the same, and thus are not reported in this note. They are available 
from the authors on request. 
12  Other candidates for instruments can be lagged values of other independent variables in the Euler equation (A1-9). Even if 
they are included in the set of instruments, however, we find no significant changes in the results.  
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Appendix 2: 
Model for simulating the bank’s 
decision regarding write-offs 
Model 
The bank utility is determined by the mean and standard deviation of the present value of future 
profits: 
)) ( ), ( ( PV PV U σ µ   (A2-1) 
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where we assume a unit subjective discount factor and a zero discount factor for inflation in the 
nominal value of profits. 
Bank capital, Capt, is the state variable, the path of which is determined by the transition equation: 
t t t t t t Others Div Tax Cap Cap − − − π + = −1  (A2-3) 
where profits (πt) reflect credit costs such as write-offs and loan loss provisions. The profit surplus, 
after deducting taxes (Taxt), dividends (Divt) and other factors (Otherst), determines the path of bank 
capital over time, as described in the transition equation (A2-3). Taxt includes government capital 
injections into banks, and Otherst covers other factors that affect bank capital, such as the introduction 
of deferred tax assets and any surplus from the revaluation of the bank’s land holdings.  
Profits πt are defined by: 
tio AdequacyRa Loans







t t ≥ − − ⋅ − ⋅ = π ,  
  otherwise , 0 =   (A2-4) 
where 
L
t R  corresponds to the average rate of return on loans (obtained as total revenue divided by 
outstanding loans), 
D
t R  captures the average cost of funding (hereafter the “average funding rate”, 
obtained by dividing total funding costs by outstanding deposits), and AdCostst measures 
administrative costs including payroll costs. 
The credit costs (CrCostst) reflected in NPL disposals comprise four parts: write-offs of new bad loans 
(NewWOt); write-offs of existing bad loans not covered by loan loss provisions (WO2t); loan loss 
provisions for new bad loans (NewLLPt); and additional loan loss provisions for bad loans which have 
been partly covered by past loan loss provisions (dLLPt). The total of WO2t and dLLPt corresponds to 
secondary losses, that is, unexpected losses which could not be predicted at the time the bank made 
its decision regarding disposals. Write-offs of bad loans with loan loss provisions (WO1t) impair neither 
current profits nor bank capital, because these credit costs regarding WO1t were reflected in previous 
profits as either NewLLPt–j or dLLPt–j (t – j < t). Write-offs of WO1t reduce possible losses via dLLPt+j, 
but this obliges the bank to give up the “real option” value inherent in bad loans, ie the possibility that 
these loans may become performing again. 
The bank balance sheet constraint is: 
t t t Cap Deposits Loans + =  (A2-5) 
We assume that all assets take the form of loans and all liabilities are deposits. The average rate of 
return on loans  ,
L
t R  therefore, represents a gross based ROA, covering revenue from securities, fees 
and commissions, in addition to income from lending. The average funding rate 
D
t R  also covers 
funding from money and bond markets in addition to deposits.  
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L
t R  and  D
t R  are determined by imposing equilibrium on the bank loan and deposit markets. First, 






t R NGDP f Loans =    and  (A2-6) 




t CapRatio BLratio Deposits R f Loans − =    i = 0,1  (A2-7) 
where NGDPt is nominal GDP, BLratiot is the ratio of bad loans to total loans, and CapRatiot is the 
capital adequacy ratio obtained simply by dividing bank capital by bank loans (total assets). A high 
BLratiot negatively affects the bank’s supply of loans for a given  , L
t R  because it requires a premium 
for taking on the higher credit risk. The equilibrium condition in the loan market provides a reduced 
form of  , L
t R  which is estimated by: 
Lt t t t t
L
t BLratio l BLratio l Depodot l NGDPdot l l R ε + + + + + = −1 4 3 2 1 0  (A2-8) 
where  NGDPdott represents the growth rate of nominal GDP, and Depodott the growth rate of 
deposits. The bank capital constraint on lending, CapRatiot, is omitted from the regression because 
the term is insignificant. 
Second, the bank’s demand for deposits and households’ supply of deposits are assumed to take the 
following shapes: 




t ExR Call Loans R f Deposits =    and  (A2-9) 




t NGDP R f Deposits =  (A2-10) 
where Callt is the call rate and ExRt is the bank’s reserves in excess of requirements. A reduced form 
of  D
t R  obtained from the deposit market equilibrium condition is estimated by: 
Dt t t t
D
t ExR d Call d NGDPdot d d R ε + + + + = ) ln( 3 2 1 0  (A2-11) 
Loanst is omitted due to its insignificance in the regression. 
Bank loans comprise both bad loans and good loans: the former are given by the “Risk Management 
Loans” disclosed by government and the Japanese Bankers’ Association, while the latter are made up 
of the remaining loans. This gives: 
t t t GoodLoans BadLoans Loans + =  (A2-12) 
Bad loans are divided into two categories; bad loans fully covered by loan loss provisions and bad 
loans proving not to be covered. We denote the former as LLPt and the latter as Nakedt. The transition 
of LLPt is given by: 
t t t t t WO dLLP NewLLP LLP LLP 1 1 − + + = −  (A2-13) 
while the transition of Nakedt is: 
t t t t t WO dLLP NewNaked Naked Naked 2 1 − − + = −  (A2-14) 
We find that the transition of bad loans: 
t t t t t t t t t WO WO NewNaked Naked NewLLP LLP BadLoans Naked LLP 2 1 ) ( 1 1 − − + + + = = + − −  (A2-15) 
is independent of dLLPt and NewWOt, and only WO1t and WO2t can effect reductions in the 
outstanding amount of bad loans. New bad loans during period t, NewBLt, are assumed to depend on 
the nominal economic growth rate (NGDPdott): 
) , ( i t t
NewBL
t dummy NGDPdot f NewBL = =    i = FY95:2, FY97:2, FY98:2  (A2-16) 
NewBLt is divided into three categories: NewNakedt, NewLLPt and NewWOt. The ratios among the two 
types of disposals (NewLLPt and NewWOt) and the uncovered outstanding amount of bad loans 
(NewNakedt) are determined by historical data on new bad loans and their disposal.  
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Equations (A2-3), (A2-5) and (A2-15) provide us with an expression describing the transition of good 
loans: 
) (
) 2 1 ( ) ( 1 1
t t t t t
t t t t t t t
Others Div Tax NewBL
WO WO NewWO Deposits Deposits GoodLoans GoodLoans
− − − π + −
+ + + − = − − −  (A2-17) 
What this equation implies is that, supposing deposits remain unchanged, the bank’s balance sheet 
freedom to expand its good loans depends on (i) total write-offs, (ii) new bad loans, and (iii) profit 
surplus. 
The decrease in bad loans through write-offs improves future profits via a recovery in the rate of return 
on loans, as described in equation (A2-8), and also via the freedom to extend new good loans. In 
contrast, the write-off impairs current capital and therefore increases the risk of coming up against the 
constraint imposed by capital adequacy regulation, as is seen in equation (A2-4). The trade-off 
between the improvement in future profits and the rise in the risk of bankruptcy determines the optimal 
choice of write-offs. This optimal choice is dependent on the different business conditions faced by the 
bank at each stage, for example: its capital adequacy, its expectations of future economic growth, and 
the extent of its bad loans. 
Details of simulation 
The bank we examined in the simulations is a representative agent endowed with the aggregate 
figures of the banking accounts of all banks in Japan. The data run from the second half of fiscal 1992 
to fiscal 2002, because NPL-related data are available only for this period. 
For the initial values of all simulation variables, we adopt the value observed at the end of fiscal 1996 
and 2000 respectively. For the exogenous deterministic variables, we make use of static expectations 
(Figure 9). Taxes, dividends and other factors in equation (A2-3) are omitted from the simulation, 
because it is difficult to make use of static expectations for variables which fluctuated significantly as a 
result of government policies such as capital injections. The influence of these variables is reflected in 
the initial values for each simulation. For technical reasons, administrative costs, which we regard as a 
proxy of payroll costs, are added to profits in the simulation. 
Since there is only one stochastic factor, the nominal GDP growth rate, the distributions of the present 
values depend on how the bank forms its expectations of the growth rate. We assume that the 
expectations are adaptive, that is, the bank expects the growth rate to follow an AR(1) process with 
the same mean and variance as in the last six half-year periods. The choice of six periods derives 
from a survey on firm expectations of the real economic growth rate that suggests it takes about three 
years for firms to correct mistaken expectations by observing actual growth rates. The AR coefficient is 
estimated to be 0.77 over the full sample period. The means and variances for the two simulations 
with different initial starting periods are shown in the appendix table. 
The simulation of “not aggressive” write-offs, starting in fiscal 1997, is based on actual figures for 
write-offs: the average of the first and second halves of fiscal 1996. The simulation of “aggressive” 
write-offs produces an amount some ¥2 trillion larger, almost the same as the average from fiscal 
1997 to 1999 when the government adopted a strong initiative to push forward NPL disposal during 
and after the banking crisis. “Aggressive” write-offs in the simulation starting in fiscal 2001 are based 
on average write-offs in fiscal 2000. Write-offs in the “not aggressive” case are set to be ¥1 trillion less, 
almost the same as their average in fiscal 1996. 
We carried out 100,000 simulations for each case. When a bank comes up against the minimum 
capital adequacy bound, this acts to terminate the loop in the updating process for the state variables: 
bank capital, and the bad loan components, LLPt and Nakedt. Distributions of present values shown in 
Figures 11-13, where there are spikes at low levels of present values, suggest that some banks gain 
profits only at early stages of the simulation and then go bankrupt. Bell-shaped distributions at higher 
levels of present values in these figures correspond to the cases where banks are still alive at the end 
of the simulation period. These distributions show that banks can enjoy higher profits in the future 
through their aggressive write-offs only if they are able to survive the capital damages that accompany 
NPL write-offs. The appendix table illustrates how aggressive write-offs improve the average rate of 
return on loans (if banks remain alive with high probability), while at the same time impairing capital 
levels.  
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Figure 1 
The liquidity premium 
and the Japan premium 
(1) The liquidity premium 
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rate policy (Feb 1999)








































































































































  Note: The Japan premium is defined as the spread in Libor between Barclays and the Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi. 
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Figure 2 
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  Note: Deposit interest rate = interest rate on three-month time deposits of less than ¥3 million. 
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Figure 3 
Credit costs and profits 
(1) Credit costs and operating profit 
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  Note: Credit cost ratio = credit costs/total loans. 
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Figure 4 
Progress in NPL disposal 
(1) Removal of NPLs 












Remaining NPLs New NPLs
–11.7
end-March 2000 end-March 2000 end-March 2000 
trn yen 
 
Notes: 1. NPLs here cover loans to borrowers classified as “bankrupt”, “de facto bankrupt” and “in danger of 
bankruptcy”. 2. Major banks here exclude Shinsei Bank and Aozora Bank. 
 
(2) Loan loss provision ratio 
(provisions/total loans) 
  All banks  Major banks (excluding Shinsei 
Bank and Aozora Bank) 
Loans to “normal” borrowers and 
borrowers that “need attention” 
 1.4  (1.1)   1.7  (1.2) 
Excluding loans requiring 
“special attention” 
 0.8  (na)   0.8  (0.7) 
Loans requiring “special 
attention” 
 19.1  (na)   20.8  (14.2) 
Loans to borrowers “in danger of 
bankruptcy” 
 33.6  (na)   39.4  (37.0) 
Note: Percentage, at end-March 2003; figures in parentheses are at end-March 2002. 
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(2) Regional banks 
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Figure 7 
Changes in loans outstanding 
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Estimation results for the 
optimisation model of bank behaviour 
Equation:  1 3
1
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0.9656 0.0062  170 



















0.9656 0.0064    2,091 








land prices b2 
















0.9601 0.0033  50 



















0.9601 0.0019  615 
Notes: t-values are in parentheses. *** 1% level. ** 5% level. * 10% level. NPL ratio (average α3) is imputed with the estimated parameters, the average of discount factors and changes in land 























Estimation results for the optimisation 
model of bank behaviour (continued) 
Equation:  1 3
1



























































 0.9633   0.0066    791 
(Reference) 
All banks 








 0.9633   0.0070    861 

























 0.9743   0.0150    50 








 0.9743   0.0116    565 
(Reference) 
All banks 








 0.9743   0.0130    615 
Notes: t-values are in parentheses. *** 1% level. ** 5% level. * 10% level. NPL ratio (average α3) is imputed with the estimated parameters, the average of discount factors and changes in land 
prices in the corresponding periods. See Appendix 1.  
100  BIS Papers No 22
 
Figure 9 
Algorithm of simulation 
  Exogenous variables 
Deterministic variables  State variables  Control variables Stochastic variables 
Endogenous variables
Economic growth rate 
Capital
Bad loans  
Deposits







Taxes dividends, others 
Administrative costs  New bad loans 
Write-offs    Loan loss provisions
Secondary loss 
(in following periods) 
Return rate on loan 
(all asset) 
Updated bad loans 
Funding rate of deposit 
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Figure 10 
Four simulation cases 
Expectation of economic growth 
 
Adaptive expectation  Perfect forecast 
Not aggressive  Case 1  Case 3  Aggressiveness in  
write-offs of bad loans 
Aggressive  Case 2  Case 4 
Note: Economic growth is measured by nominal GDP growth rate. Adaptive expectation is based on mean and standard 
deviation of the growth rates for the preceding six half-year periods. Perfect forecast case does not mean the bank’s perfect 
forecast of the future path of the growth rate, but assumes that the bank can correctly predict its mean and standard 
deviation. See Appendix 2 for details on the amount of write-offs in the four cases. 
 
Figure 11 
Mean and standard deviation 
of the bank’s present value (1) 








0 2  4 6 8 10
std PV (trillion yen)
mean PV 
(trillion yen) 
Case 1-A  (not aggressive)
Case 2-A  (aggressive) 
Case 1-B  (not aggressive)
Case 2-B  (aggressive) 
 Without capital adequacy regulation
Under capital adequacy regulation
 
 
Distributions of present values 






































Note: Present values of profits are measured for next six half-year periods using unit subjective discount factor. See 
Appendix 2 for details.  
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Figure 12 
Mean and standard deviation 
of the bank’s present value (2) 
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Perfect forecast of economic growth
Adaptive expectation 
of economic growth 
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Figure 13 
Mean and standard deviation 
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means through simulation periods (in trillions of yen) 
(Termination 
ratio, %) 



















Fiscal 1997, without capital adequacy regulation 
Case A1 (0)  1.0  0.5 1.9 1.1  27 3.5  4.1  24 11 
Case A2 (0)  1.0 0.5  2.1  1.1  27  4.5  4.1  19    8 
Fiscal 1997, under capital adequacy regulation 
Case B1 (49)  1.0 0.5  1.8  1.1  26  3.4  4.0  24  11 
Case B2 (72)  1.0 0.5  1.2  0.7  16  2.7  2.4  13    6 
Case B3 (14)  –0.1 1.0  1.7  0.9  27  3.6  4.5  25  11 
Case B4 (36)  –0.1 1.0  1.5  0.7  22  0.4  3.6  16    7 
Fiscal 2001, under capital adequacy regulation 
Case C1 (45)  –0.2 0.9  0.9  0.6  29  2.4  4.4  32    8 
Case C2 (11)  –0.2 0.9  1.2  0.6  31  2.6  4.6  31    5 
Note: Since “high termination ratio” cases produce zero values for all variables after termination, average values in the table 
tend to be lower than in “low termination ratio” cases. 
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